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Abstract
We study bilateral trading networks with imperfectly transferable utility
and frictions. Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria
in trading networks are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospi-
tals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, compactness of the set
of equilibria and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold without the as-
sumption of quasi-linear utility in transfers. While our results are developed
in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for
exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-sided matching
markets with transfers. JEL-classification:C78, D47, D52, L14
Keywords: Trading Networks; Full Substitutability; Imperfectly Transfer-
able Utility; Competitive Equilibrium; Indivisible Goods; Frictions; Lattice;
Rural Hospitals
1 Introduction
The assumption of quasi-linear utility in transfers is pervasive in theoretical models
of matching markets, exchange economies with indivisible goods, trading networks
and in mechanism design. In many situations, quasi-linearity simplifies the anal-
ysis considerably: In the context of exchange economies, matching markets and
trading networks, quasi-linearity allows us to use the duality between optimal allo-
cations and supporting equilibrium prices. Similarly, under quasi-linearity, linear
programming techniques can be used to solve mechanism design problems (Vohra,
∗I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF)
under project 100018-150086. I thank Ravi Jagadeesan, Bettina Klaus, Alex Nichifor, Alex
Teytelboym and Klaus Zauner, seminar participants at HEC Lausanne, participants of the 2018
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comments.
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2011). While the assumption of quasi-linearity simplifies the theoretical analysis,
it often is empirically problematic. Wealth effects are present in marriage and
labor markets so that matching models with transferable utility are unrealistic for
these applications. Even if wealth effects are not present, transaction frictions such
as those induced by taxation (Dupuy et al., 2017), by bargaining costs or trans-
action costs, make a transferable utility model inapplicable. This has motivated
researchers to explore how results for matching markets with transfers (Demange
and Gale, 1985; Legros and Newman, 2007; Galichon et al., 2018; No¨ldeke and
Samuelson, 2018), in mechanism design (No¨ldeke and Samuelson, 2018) and for
trading networks (Fleiner et al., 2018; Hatfield et al., 2018) can be generalized
beyond quasi-linear utility.
In this paper, we contribute to this discussion of imperfectly transferable utility
and frictions, in the context of bilateral trading networks (Hatfield et al., 2013).
Trading networks with bilateral contracts allow to model complex supply chains in
an industry where firms are engaged in upstream as well as downstream contracts.
These networked markets generalize two-sided matching markets, in the sense that
they replace a bipartite graph of potential marriages or working relations, by an
arbitrary graph of potential trading relations. We show that important structural
results for bilateral trading networks do not depend on the assumption of quasi-
linear utility, and establish several results about the set of competitive equilibria
under minimal assumptions of continuity and monotonicity of the utility functions.
Thus, our results apply even in the case of imperfectly transferable utility and in
the presence of frictions.
While our results are established in a general model of bilateral trading net-
works, the results are already new for the case of many-to-one matching markets
and imply new results for the case of object allocation with combinatorial de-
mand. In particular, analogous results to ours for two-sided matching markets
have previously only been established for the case of quasi-linear utility or for dis-
crete markets with strict preferences. Moreover, we develop results for exchange
economies with indivisible goods without making the assumption of quasi-linear
utility. This analysis extends the quasi-linear theory (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999)
and hopefully provides useful tools for the design of combinatorial auctions.
Our results can be summarized as follow: Even without quasi-linearity, we
show that the set of competitive equilibria has a lattice structure, provided that
full substitutability (Sun and Yang, 2006; Ostrovsky, 2008; Hatfield et al., 2013)
and the laws of aggregate demand and supply (Ostrovsky, 2008; Hatfield et al.,
2018) hold. Moreover, under the same assumptions, we show that the difference
between the number of signed downstream and the number of signed upstream
contracts is the same for each firm in each equilibrium (this is a generalization
of the rural hospitals theorem from matching theory). If we make the additional
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assumption of bounded willingness to pay (as introduced by Fleiner et al., 2018)
the set of equilibrium prices (of realized) trades is compact and the lattice of com-
petitive equilibria is bounded: There exists an equilibrium that is most preferred
by terminal sellers and an equilibrium that is most preferred by terminal buy-
ers among all equilibria. The latter result allows us to obtain a group-incentive
compatibility result. We show that a mechanism that selects buyer-optimal equi-
libria is group-strategy-proof for terminal buyers on the domain of unit-demand
utility functions and similarly a mechanism that selects seller-optimal equilibria
is group-strategy-proof for terminal sellers on the domain of unit-supply utility
functions.
We hope that our results will provide useful in applied work on markets with
imperfectly transferable utility and frictions: Structural econometric models for
matching markets have recently been generalized beyond transferable utility (Gali-
chon et al., 2018). This work draws on insights from the theoretical matching liter-
ature, using the Gross Substitutability condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) for
the existence result. Our theoretical work and complementary results in Fleiner
et al. (2018) and Hatfield et al. (2018) could be useful in extending this work
beyond two-sided markets. In a different direction, our group-strategy-proofness
should be appealing for applied work in marked design. Our result allows to deal
with transfers in a fully general way without the restriction to quasi-linear pref-
erences which is often violated in practice. Moreover, from a conceptual point
of view, working with continuous transfers forces us to deal with the issue of tie-
breaking. We believe that similar techniques as developed in the present paper can
be used for dealing with issues of tie-breaking in matching markets with discrete
transfers and ties in preferences.
1.1 Related Literature
The literature on trading networks has its origins in the literature on matching
markets with transfers. In a seminal paper, Kelso and Crawford (1982) show that,
under the assumption of gross substitutability, competitive equilibria with person-
alized prices exist and are equivalent to core allocations in a many-to-one labor
market matching model. The construction is by an approximation argument when
the existence in the continuum is obtained from the existence of an equilibrium in
a discrete markets with smaller and smaller price increments. Different versions of
a (group-)strategy-proofness result for a many-to-one matching model with con-
tinuous transfers have been established by Hatfield et al. (2014); Schlegel (2016);
Jagadeesan et al. (2018).
Subsequent to Kelso and Crawford (1982), the question of existence of equilibria
has been studied in the context of exchange economies with indivisibilities. See
for example Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and the recent contribution of Baldwin and
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Klemperer (2016).
Trading networks with bilateral contracts and continuous transfers have been
introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013). Under the assumption of quasi-linear utility
and full substitutability they establish many results that we generalize to the case
of general utility functions. The notion of full substitutability has been studied in
detail by Hatfield et al. (2019) who show the equivalence of various different defini-
tions of full substitutability. The existence result of Hatfield et al. (2013) is proved
via a reduction to the existence result of Kelso and Crawford (1982). An alterna-
tive approach is via a submodular version of a network flow problem (Candogan
et al., 2016).
The work of Hatfield et al. (2013) builds on the work of Ostrovsky (2008) on
trading networks with discrete contracts that generalizes matching models with
contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005; Fleiner, 2003; Roth, 1984) beyond two-
sided markets. The matching model with contracts in turn originates in the dis-
crete version of the model of Kelso and Crawford (1982). Hatfield and Kominers
(2012) and Fleiner et al. (2016) provide additional results for the discrete trad-
ing networks model, which in many ways are parallel to the results we obtain
in the continuous model. Importantly, results for the discrete model rely on the
assumption of strict preferences.
All the above mentioned work for continuous models make the assumption of
quasi-linear utility for at least one side of the market.1 There are two papers that
deal with general, not necessarily quasi-linear, utility functions and are particularly
close to our work: In a classical paper, Demange and Gale (1985) establish several
structural results about the core (or equivalently the set of competitive equilibria)
for a one-to-one matching model with continuous transfers. In particular, they
show that the core has a lattice structure and an agent that is unmatched in one
core allocation receives his reservation utility in each core allocation (the result
is often called the rural hospital theorem in the literature on discrete matching
markets). Moreover, they show that the mechanism that selects an extreme point
of the bounded lattice is strategy-proof for one side of the market. Importantly,
these results are established without assuming quasi-linearity in transfers. They
only require that utility is increasing, continuous in transfers and satisfies a full
range assumption. We generalize this work to trading networks with bilateral
contracts.
In recent work, Fleiner et al. (2018) study trading networks with general pref-
erences. Their work is in many regards complementary to our work. In particular,
Fleiner et al. (2018) establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium under
1 Note however that the existence proof of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is actually more general
and also applies to non-quasi-linear preferences, provided they are continuous, monotonic and
unbounded in transfers for each bundle.
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the assumption of Full Substitutability and mild regularity conditions, using the
approximation approach of Kelso and Crawford (1982). Moreover, they study the
efficiency of competitive equilibria and provide conditions under which equilibria
correspond to allocations satisfying different related cooperative solution concepts.
We derive our results for competitive equilibria. However, by the equivalence result
of Fleiner et al. (2018) analogous results also would hold for trail-stable allocations.
All results of Hatfield et al. (2013), except for the maximal domain result (The-
orem 7) are generalized to imperfectly transferable utility, either in our work or
by Fleiner et al. (2018). Table 1 in Appendix H summarizes known results for
trading networks with non-quasi-linear utility.
2 Model
The model is based on Hatfield et al. (2013), and the extensions of Hatfield et al.
(2018) and Fleiner et al. (2018). We consider a finite set of firms F and a finite
set of trades Ω. Each trade ω ∈ Ω is associated with a buyer b(ω) ∈ F and a
seller s(ω) ∈ F with b(ω) 6= s(ω). For a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω and firm f ∈ F
we define the set of downstream trades for f by Ψf→ := {ω ∈ Ψ : s(ω) = f}
and the set of upstream trades by Ψ→f := {ω ∈ Ω : b(x) = f}. Moreover, we
let Ψf := Ψf→ ∪ Ψ→f . A firm f ∈ F such that Ωf→ = ∅ is called a terminal
buyer and a firm such that Ω→f = ∅ is called a terminal buyer. Note that
terminal buyers and/or terminal buyers do not need to exist. A contract is a pair
(ω, pω) ∈ Ω× R, where pω is the price attached to the trade ω.
An allocation is a pair (Ψ, p) consisting of a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω and a
price vector p ∈ RΨ. We denote the set of allocations by A and we let Af :=
{(Ψf , (pω)ω∈Ψf ) : (Ψ, p) ∈ A}. An arrangement is a pair [Ψ, p] ∈ 2Ω ×RΩ. Thus
in contrast to an allocation the price vector also contains prices for unrealized
trades.
2.1 Utility functions
Each firm has a utility function uf : Af → R∪{−∞}. For notational convenience
we extend uf to 2Ω×RΩ by defining for Ψ ⊆ Ω and p ∈ RΩ, the utility uf (Ψ, p) :=
uf (Ψf , (pω)ω∈Ψf ). As Hatfield et al. (2013), we allow the utility function to take
on a value of −∞ to model technical constraints faced by a firm. We require that
uf (Ψ, p) = −∞ implies uf (Ψ, p′) = −∞ for each p′ ∈ RΨ and that uf (∅) > −∞.
We make the following assumptions on utility functions:
• Continuity: For Ψ ⊆ Ωf with uf (Ψ, ·) > −∞ the functions uf (Ψ, ·) is
continuous on RΨ.
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• Monotonicity: For Ψ ⊆ Ωf with uf (Ψ, ·) > −∞ and p, p′ ∈ RΨ with p′ 6= p:
1. If p′ω = pω for ω ∈ Ψf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ψ→f , then uf (Ψ, p) >
uf (Ψ, p′).
2. If p′ω = pω for ω ∈ Ψ→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ψf→, then uf (Ψ, p) >
uf (Ψ, p′).
Thus utility is continuous in prices and firms prefer higher sell prices strictly to
lower sell prices and lower buy prices strictly to higher buy prices.
Remark 1. Note that we allow utility for a set of trades Ψ to be different for prices
p, p′ ∈ RΨ, even if the net transfers received are the same for both price vectors,
i.e. even if
∑
ω∈Ψf→ pω −
∑
ω∈Ψ→f pω =
∑
ω∈Ψf→ p
′
ω −
∑
ω∈Ψ→f p
′
ω. This can for
example be the case when there are transactions taxes for some of the trades (as
in Dupuy et al. (2017) or in the examples discussed by Fleiner et al. (2018)).
If utility only depends on the set of trades and the net transfers received, we
have a special case of our model: Following the terminology of Fleiner et al. (2018),
we say that uf satisfies no frictions if there is a function u˜f : 2Ωf×R→ R∪{−∞}
that is increasing in the second argument such that
uf (Ψ, p) = u˜f (Ψ,
∑
ω∈Ψf→
pω −
∑
ω∈Ψ→f
pω).
Quasi-linear utility corresponds to the case, where there are no frictions and u˜f is
linear in transfers. In this case there is a valuation function vf : 2Ωf → R∪{−∞}
such that
u˜f (Ψ, t) = vf (Ψ) + t.
A utility functions induces a demand correspondence Df : RΩ ⇒ 2Ωf by:
Df (p) := argmaxΨ⊆Ωfu
f (Ψ, p).
It is a straightforward consequence of the continuity of the utility function that
the demand correspondence satisfies the following continuity property:
Upper Hemi-Continuity: Let ‖ · ‖ be the Euclidean norm.2 The demand corre-
spondence Df is upper-hemicontinuous, if for each p ∈ RΩ there is an  > 0 such
for any q ∈ RΩ with ‖p− q‖ < , we have Df (q) ⊆ Df (p).
Lemma 1. For a continuous utility function uf the induced demand Df is upper
hemi-continuous.
For completeness, the appendix contains a proof of the lemma.
2As usual, we could replace the Euclidean norm by any norm on RΩ.
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2.2 Full substitutability and the laws of aggregate demand and supply
We now introduce several properties (same side substitutability, cross-side comple-
mentarity and their combination called full substitutability) of demand functions
that have been well-studied in the literature. We use the “demand language” (Hat-
field et al., 2019) definitions of the properties.
The following two properties have been originally introduced by Ostrovsky
(2008) for a discrete model of trading networks with contracts.
Same-Side Substitutability (SSS): For p, p′ ∈ RΩ and each Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) there
exists a Ψ ∈ Df (p) such that if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f ,
then
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′→f ,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
{ω ∈ Ψf→ : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′f→.
Cross-Side Complementarity (CSC): For p, p′ ∈ RΩ and each Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′)
there exists a Ψ ∈ Df (p) such if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f ,
then
Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψf→,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
Ψ′→f ⊆ Ψ→f .
The combination of the two properties is called full substitutability.
Full Substitutability (FS): The demand of firm f satisfies Full Substitutability
if it satisfies Same-Side Substitutability and Cross-Side Complementarity.
Remark 2. As observed by Hatfield et al. (2019) in their Appendix A, there is
an “expansion version” and a “contraction version” of full substitutability that
differ with regard to how the conditions are defined at price vectors where mul-
tiple bundles of trades are optimal. Our definition uses the expansion version of
the properties. Hatfield et al. (2019) show that under the assumption of quasi-
linearity, the expansion and contraction version of full substitutability are equiv-
alent. Without quasi-linearity, however, the equivalence no longer holds. We
discuss in Appendix B how several different versions of the properties are logically
related. Under quasi-linear utility, a weaker version of full substitutability in which
the property is only imposed at price vectors where the demand is single-valued
is equivalent to our version of full substitutability (Hatfield et al., 2019). We call
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{α1, β1}
{α2, β2}{α1, β2}
{α2, β1}
pα1
pβ1
{{α1, β1}, {α1, β2}, {α2, β1}, {α2, β2}, {α1, α2, β1, β2}}
pα2 = 1 = pβ2
{{α1, β1}, {α1, β2}}
{{α2, β1}, {α2, β1}}
{{α1, β2}, {α2, β2}}
{{α1, β1}, {α2, β1}}
(1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure 1: The demand in price space for pα2 = 1 = pβ2 .
this property weak full substitutability.3
Weak Full Substitutability: For p, p′ ∈ RΩ such that Df (p) = {Ψ} and
Df (p′) = {Ψ′}, if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f , then
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′→f and Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψf→,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
{ω ∈ Ψf→ : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′f→ and Ψ′→f ⊆ Ψ→f .
The following counter-example shows that weak full substitutability is strictly
weaker than full substitutability for general utility functions. In Section 3, we will
use the counter-example to show that under weak full substitutability, the results
in our paper do not necessarily hold. See Figure 1 for a geometric representation
of the demand in the example.
Example 1. Consider four trades Ω = {α1, α2, β1, β2} with f = b(α1) = b(α2) =
3Fleiner et al. (2018) call this property “full substitutability”. Thus they reserve the term
full substitutability for the weaker notion and all of their results hold for the weaker notion of
full substitutability. Our use of the term full substitutability is consistent with the use of the
term in Hatfield et al. (2018). They establish the equivalence of chain stability and stability in
trading networks for general utility functions under the assumption of the stronger version of full
substitutability that we also use.
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s(β1) = s(β2). We let
uf (∅) = 0,
uf ({αi, βj}, pαi , pβj) = 2− pαi + pβj , for i, j,= 1, 2,
uf ({α1, α2, β1, β2}, p) = 4− exp
(
pα1 + pα2
2
− 1
)
− exp
(
1− pβ1 + pβ2
2
)
.
We let uf (Ψ, p) = −∞ for each other Ψ ⊆ Ω. Observe that
Df (1, 1, 1, 1) = {{α1, β1}, {α1, β2}, {α2, β1}, {α2, β2}, {α1, α2, β1, β2}}
but
Df (0, 1, 1, 1) = {{α1, β1}, {α1, β2}}.
As {α1, α2, β1, β2} ∈ Df (1, 1, 1, 1), Full Substitutability would require that there
is a Ψ ∈ Df (0, 1, 1, 1) with {β1, β2} ⊆ Ψ. Hence Full Substitutability is not
satisfied. As the demand at (0, 1, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1, 1) is multi-valued, Weak Full
Substitutability does not impose any structure here. More generally, note that if
we replace uf by the quasi-linear utility function u˜f such that
u˜f ({α1, α2, β1, β2}, ·) = −∞
u˜f (Ψ, ·) = uf (Ψ, ·) for Ψ 6= {α1, α2, β1, β2},
only the demand at prices (1, 1, 1, 1) changes. One readily checks that u˜f satisfies
Full Substitutability. Hence uf satisfies Weak Full Substitutability.
The other two properties that we consider throughout the paper are mono-
tonicity properties called the Law of Aggregate Demand respectively the Law of
Aggregate Supply.4 Under quasi-linear utility, the two properties are implied by
(weak) full substitutability. However, in general they are independent of full sub-
stitutability.
Law of Aggregate Demand (LAD): For p, p′ ∈ RΩ and each Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′)
there exists a Ψ ∈ Df (p) such that if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for
ω ∈ Ω→f , then
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ψ′→f | − |Ψ′f→|.
Law of Aggregate Supply (LAS): For p, p′ ∈ RΩ and each Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) there
exists a Ψ ∈ Df (p) such that if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→,
then
|Ψf→| − |Ψ→f | ≥ |Ψ′f→| − |Ψ′→f |.
4The definitions are the demand-language versions of the (choice-language) definitions of Hat-
field et al. (2019). See Definition 10 in their paper.
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The combination of full substitutability and the laws of aggregate demand and
supply imply an invariance property of the demand that will be crucial for many
of our results. It states that if a bundle of trades is demanded by a firm f at
a price vector, then this bundle is also demanded by f , if all downstream trades
for f in the bundle become more expensive, all downstream trades f not in the
bundle become cheaper, all upstream trades f in the bundle become cheaper, and
all upstream trades for f not in the bundle become more expensive.
Lemma 2. Let Df satisfy FS, LAD and LAS. Let p, p′ ∈ RΩ and Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′). If
pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ \ Ψ′f→, pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ψ′f→, pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f \ Ψ′→f
and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ψ′→f , then Ψ′ ∈ Df (p). Moreover, if all of the inequalities
are strict, then Df (p) = {Ψ′}.
Remark 3. Note that the lemma fails to hold under weak FS: For the utility
function uf in Example 1, we have Ψ′ = {α1, α2, β1, β2} ∈ Df (1, 1, 1, 1), but Ψ′ /∈
Df (0, 1, 1, 1).
3 Results
3.1 The Lattice Theorem and the Rural Hospitals Theorem
We now establish that equilibrium prices in trading networks form a lattice and
that (modulo indifferences) for each firm the difference between the number of
signed upstream and downstream contracts is the same in each equilibrium. These
results extend results established by Hatfield et al. (2013) for the case of quasi-
linear utility functions.
In the following, a competitive equilibrium for utility profile u = (uf )f∈F
is an arrangement [Ψ, p] ∈ 2Ω × RΩ such that for each f ∈ F and the demand
Df induced by uf we have Ψf ∈ Df (p). We call (Ψ, (pω)ω∈Ψ) the equilibrium
allocation induced by [Ψ, p]. We denote the set of equilibrium price vectors for u
by E(u) and define for each price vector p ∈ RΩ the (possibly empty) set E(u, p) :=
{Ψ ⊆ Ω : Ψf ∈ Df (p) for each f ∈ F} of sets of trades that support p as a
competitive equilibrium under u.
Theorem 1. Let u be a utility profile such that for each firm the induced demand
satisfies Full Substitutability and the Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply.
1. Lattice Theorem: Let p, p′ ∈ E(u) be competitive equilibrium prices. Then
the price vectors p¯, p ∈ RΩ defined by
p¯ω := max{pω, p′ω}, pω := min{pω, p′ω},
are competitive equilibrium prices.
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2. Rural Hospitals Theorem: Let p, p′ ∈ E(u) be competitive equilibrium
prices. For each Ψ ∈ E(u, p) there exists a Ψ′ ∈ E(u, p′) such that for each
f ∈ F we have |Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| = |Ψ′→f | − |Ψ′f→|.
Our next example shows that the first part of the theorem can fail to hold if we
drop LAD. A similar example can be constructed to show the necessity of LAS. It
is well-known that the theorem fails to hold without FS, even under quasi-linear
utility functions.
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Let b(ωi) = f for i = 1, 2, 3 and s(ωi) 6= s(ωj)
for i 6= j. We let us(ωi)(ωi, pi) = pi, us(ωi)(∅) = −2 for i = 1, 2 and us(ω3)(ω3, p3) =
p3, u
s(b3)(∅) = 1. We define uf by
uf (∅) = 0,
uf ({ωi}, pi) = 1− pi for i = 1, 2, 3
uf ({ωi, ωj}, (pi, pj)) = 3.5− pi − pj for i, j = 1, 2, 3
uf ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, p) =
{
4− p1 − p2 − p3, if p1 + p2 + p3 ≥ 0
4− 1
2
(p1 + p2 + p3), if p1 + p2 + p3 < 0.
The utility functions of the three sellers are unit supply and thus satisfy full sub-
stitutability. To see that the utility function of f satisfies full substitutability, note
that the modified utility function u˜f with u˜f (Ψ, ·) = uf (Ψ, ·) for Ψ 6= {ω1, ω2, ω3},
and u˜f ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, p) = 4− p1 − p2 − p3 for all p ∈ RΩ, satisfies FS and observe
that for each p ∈ RΩ we have
uf ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, p) ≤ u˜f ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, p).
Thus, FS for uf follows from FS for u˜f .
Now consider the price vectors p = (0,−2, 0) and p′ = (−2, 0, 0). Note
that {ω1, ω2} ∈ Df (p) and {ω1, ω2} ∈ Df (p′). Moreover, we have Ds(ω1)(p) =
Ds(ω
1)(p′) = {ω1}, Ds(ω2)(p) = Ds(ω2)(p′) = {ω2} and Ds(ω3)(p) = {∅} = Ds(ω3)(p′).
Thus p and p′ are equilibrium price vectors. Now consider the price vector p¯ =
(0, 0, 0). Note that for any i, j, k = 1, 2, 3,
uf ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, (0, 0, 0)) = 4 > 3.5 = uf ({ωi, ωj}, (0, 0)) > uf (ωk, 0) = 1 > 0 = uf (∅).
Thus Df (p¯) = {{ω1, ω2, ω3}}. However, Ds(ω3)(0, 0, 0) = {∅}. Thus p¯ = (1, 1, 1) is
not an equilibrium price vector.
The theorem also fails to hold if we replace full substitutability by weak full
substitutability.
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Example 1 (cont.). Consider the set of trades Ω = {α1, α2, β1, β2} and firm f
with the utility function uf as defined in Example 1. The induced demand Df
satisfies weak full substitutability as previously shown. Moreover, for each p ∈
RΩ and Ψ ∈ Df (p) we have |Ψf→| = |Ψ→f |. Thus Df satisfies the Laws of
Aggregate Demand and Supply. Consider four additional firms s1, s2, b1, b2 with
s1 = s(α1), s2 = s(α2), b1 = b(β1) and b2 = b(β2). Define utility functions for the
additional firms as follows: For i = 1, 2 define
us
i
({αi}, pαi) = pαi ,
ub
i
({βi}, pβi) = 2− pβi ,
us
i
(∅) = ubi(∅) = 0.
Observe that the equilibria for u are [Ω, (1, 1, 1, 1)] and [{αi, βj}, (0, 0, 2, 2)] for
i, j = 1, 2. In particular, the vector (1, 1, 2, 2) is not an equilibrium price vector,
since Ds
1
(1, 1, 2, 2) = {{α1}} and Ds2(1, 1, 2, 2) = {{α2}} but Df (1, 1, 2, 2) =
{{α1, β1}, {α1, β2}, {α2, β1}, {α2, β2}}. Similarly, (0, 0, 1, 1) is not an equilibrium
price vector.
3.2 Compactness and extremal points of the lattice
So far we have not considered whether competitive equilibria exist in our model
and, in principle, the lattice in Theorem 1 could be empty. However, as shown
by Fleiner et al. (2018), under the assumption of (weak) full substitutability and
a very mild regularity condition called bounded compensating variations there al-
ways exists a competitive equilibrium. The condition rules out for example the
case that for a trade the seller would never sell under any price and the buyer
would buy under any price. Fleiner et al. (2018) also introduce a stronger reg-
ularity condition such that under this condition and (weak) full substitutability,
competitive equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to trail-stable outcomes which is
a cooperative solution concepts that generalizes pairwise stability from matching
markets. Their condition is the following:
Bounded willingness to pay (BWP): The utility function uf satisfies bounded
willingness to pay if there exists a K > 0 such that for all p ∈ RΩ and Ψ ∈ Df (p)
if ω ∈ Ψ→f then pω < K and if ω ∈ Ψf→ then pω > −K.
Under the assumption of BWP and an additional assumption that we call “no
undesired trades”, the set of equilibrium price vectors is compact. “No undesired
trades” requires that for each trade there is a (high enough) price such that the
seller would like to execute the trade and a (low enough) price such that the buyer
would like to execute the trade.
12
No undesired trades (NUT): The utility function uf satisfies no undesired
trades if there exists a K > 0 such that for all p ∈ RΩ and Ψ ∈ Df (p), if pω > K
and s(ω) = f then ω ∈ Ψ, and if pω < −K and b(ω) = f , then ω ∈ Ψ.
Next we show that under the assumption of BWP and NUT, the set of equilib-
rium price vectors is compact. As a corollary of this result and the lattice result
of the previous section, we obtain the result that there exist extremal points in
the set of equilibrium vectors, provided that BWP, NUT, FS and LAD/LAS are
satisfied.
Theorem 2. Under the assumption of BWP and NUT the set of competitive
equilibrium vectors is a compact set.
Proof. Following an idea of Kelso and Crawford (1982), we can characterize com-
petitive equilibria by a zero-surplus condition: Define a surplus function RΩ → R
by
Z(p) := min
Ψ⊆Ω
max
f∈F
max
Ψ′⊆Ωf
uf (Ψ′, p)− uf (Ψ, p).
By definition, for each f ∈ F , we have Df (p) = argmaxΨ′⊆Ωfuf (Ψ′, p). Thus for
each arrangement [Ψ, p], we have maxf∈F maxΨ′⊆Ωf u
f (Ψ′, p) − uf (Ψ, p) ≥ 0 with
equality if and only if Ψ ∈ E(u, p). Thus p ∈ E(u) if and only if Z(p) = 0.
Now note that the surplus function is continuous, as uf (Ψ′, p) − uf (Ψ, p) is
continuous in p and the maximum resp. minimum of finitely many continuous
functions is continuous. Thus the set of competitive equilibrium vectors is closed,
as it is the pre-image of the closed set {0} under the continuous map Z. By BWP
there is a K > 0 such that for each equilibrium [Ψ, p] we have −K < pω < K
for ω ∈ Ψ, and by NUT there is a K ′ > 0 such that for each equilibrium [Ψ, p]
we have −K ′ < pω < K ′ for ω ∈ Ω \ Ψ. Thus for K¯ = max{K,K ′} we have
E(u) ⊆ [−K¯, K¯]Ω and E(u) is bounded. Hence E(u) is compact.
Corollary 1. Under the assumption of BWP, NUT, FS, LAD and LAS, the set
of competitive equilibrium price vectors is a bounded lattice.
Proof. By Theorem 2, E(u) is compact, and by Corollary 2 in Fleiner et al. (2018),
E(u) is non-empty. Thus for each ω ∈ Ω, the set {pω ∈ R : p ∈ E(u)} is compact
and non-empty. Thus for each ω ∈ Ω there exists a pω ∈ E(u) with pωω = max{pω :
p ∈ E(u)}. Taking the join of the finite set of vectors (pω)ω∈Ω yields an equilibrium
price vector, which by definition is the maximal element of the lattice. A similar
argument establishes the existence of a minimal element of the lattice.
Remark 4. For the case of quasi-linear utility functions, the assumption of BWP
and NUT is equivalent to requiring that all valuations are finite, i.e. that vf (Ψ) >
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−∞ for each Ψ ⊆ Ωf . In particular, if all valuations are finite, the set of equilib-
rium prices under quasi-linear and fully substitutable utility functions is a bounded
lattice (as already remarked by Hatfield et al., 2013). The assumption of finite
utility alone, however, does not imply BWP or NUT for general utility functions.
In the case of no frictions, we can alternatively use a full range assumption
on utility functions, which requires that for each Ψ ⊆ Ωf with Ψ 6= ∅, u˜f (Ψ, ·) is
a surjective function onto R. One can show that under the full range assumption,
FS, LAD and LAS the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors is a bounded
lattice.
Under BWP alone, the set of equilibrium vectors can fail to be bounded for
trades that are never realized under any prices. However, equilibrium prices are
still bounded for all other trades. In particular, we can obtain the result that there
exist an equilibrium that is a most preferred equilibrium for all terminal buyers
and an equilibrium that is a most preferred equilibrium for all terminal sellers.
Theorem 3 (Existence of Extremal Equilibria). Under the assumption of
BWP, FS, LAD and LAS, there exists a seller-optimal equilibrium, i.e. a [Ψ¯, p¯]
with Ψ¯ ∈ E(u, p) such that for each terminal seller f ∈ F :
uf (Ψ¯, p¯) ≥ uf (Ψ, p) for each [Ψ, p] with Ψ ∈ E(u, p),
and a buyer-optimal equilibrium, i.e. a [Ψ, p] with Ψ ∈ E(u, p) such that for each
terminal buyer f ∈ F :
uf (Ψ, p) ≥ uf (Ψ, p) for each [Ψ, p] with Ψ ∈ E(u, p).
Proof. By BWP there is a K > 0 such that for each f ∈ F and each p ∈ RΩ,
if Ψ ∈ Df (p) then pω < K for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω > −K for ω ∈ Ωf→. Thus for
each equilibrium [Ψ, p] there is a p′ ∈ [−K,K]Ω with Ψ ∈ E(u, p′) and p′ω = pω
for each ω ∈ Ψ. Observe that the argument for establishing that E(u) is closed in
the proof of Theorem 2 only depended on BWP. Thus E(u) is closed and E ′(u) :=
E(u) ∩ [−K,K]Ω is compact. Now using the same argument as in the proof of
Corollary 1, we can show that
p¯ = (max{pw : p ∈ E ′(u)})ω∈Ω,
and
p = (min{pw : p ∈ E ′(u)})ω∈Ω
exist and p¯, p ∈ E ′(u). For each p ∈ E(u) and Ψ ∈ E(u, p) there is a p′ ∈ E ′(u)
with p′ω = pω for ω ∈ Ψ and Ψ ∈ E(u, p′). Thus for each terminal seller f , and
each Ψ¯ ∈ E(u, p¯),
uf (Ψ¯, p¯) ≥ uf (Ψ, p¯) ≥ uf (Ψ, p′) = uf (Ψ, p),
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and for each terminal buyer f , and Ψ ∈ E(u, p),
uf (Ψ, p) ≥ uf (Ψ, p) ≥ uf (Ψ, p′) = uf (Ψ, p),
Remark 5. Under the assumptions of (weak) FS and BWP, Fleiner et al. (2018) es-
tablish that equilibrium allocations are equivalent to trail-stable allocations. Thus,
alternatively the theorem could be stated in the form that under BWP, FS, LAD,
LAS there is a seller-optimal trail-stable allocation and a buyer-optimal trail-stable
allocation.
3.3 Strategic Considerations
The existence of buyer-optimal equilibria established in Theorem 3, allows us to
obtain a group-incentive compatibility result.5 In the following, a domain of utility
profiles is a set U =×f∈F Uf where Uf is a set of (continuous and monotonic) util-
ity functions for firm f . A mechanism is a function M : U → A. A mechanism
is (weakly) group-strategy-proof for a set of workers F ′ ⊆ F on the domain
U ′ ⊆ U if for each u, u˜ ∈ U ′ with u˜−F ′ = u−F ′ , there exist a f ∈ F ′ with
uf (M(u)) ≥ uf (M(u˜)).
Theorem 3 allows us to define a class of focal mechanisms on the domain of
utility profiles satisfying BWP, FS, LAD and LAS: a buyer-optimal mechanism
maps to each utility profile a buyer-optimal equilibrium allocation.
To obtain a group-strategy-proofness results for terminal buyers for the buyer-
optimal mechanism, we have to restrict the domain. In the following a unit
demand utility function is a uf such that for the induced demand Df at each
p ∈ RΩ and Ψ ∈ Df (p) we have |Ψ→f | ≤ 1.
To establish group-strategy-proofness for terminal buyers, we simplify and
adapt to our context an argument introduced by Hatfield and Kojima (2009) for
matching with contracts.6 As observed by Jagadeesan et al. (2018), the argument
of Hatfield and Kojima (2009) relies crucially on the possibility of reporting pref-
erences with income effects. Hence working with the larger domain of continuous
and monotonic utility functions instead of quasi-linear utility functions is crucial
for the argument. However, our result implies (a forteriori) that a buyer-optimal
5In the following we talk about incentives for terminal buyers. A completely analogous result
also holds for terminal sellers.
6The mechanism falls outside of the domain defined by Barbera` et al. (2016) on which strategy-
proofness is equivalent to (weak)-group-strategy-proofness. Thus, it is not sufficient to only show
strategy-proofness and invoke the result of Barbera` et al. (2016).
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mechanism is also group-strategyproof on the domain of quasi-linear utility func-
tions such that terminal buyers have unit demand and all other firms have FS
demand.
Theorem 4. Each buyer-optimal mechanism is group-strategy-proof for terminal
buyers on the domain of utility profiles such that terminal buyers’ utility functions
satisfy Unit Demand and BWP and all other firms’ utility functions satisfy BWP,
FS, LAD and LAS.
4 Competitive equilibrium with uniform pricing
In this section, we apply the model to the exchange of indivisible objects. The re-
sult extend results of Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Hatfield et al. (2013) (see the
discussion in their Section IV.B) to imperfectly transferable utility. As Gul and
Stacchetti (1999), we maintain the assumption that the market is cleared through
transfers of a perfectly divisible good and there is no constraint on the amount
of the divisible good an agent can consume. Moreover, negative quantities of the
divisible good can be consumed. However, we do not assume that utility in the
divisible good is quasi-linear. Similar assumption are standard in the object allo-
cation literature with general preferences, see for example Morimoto and Serizawa
(2015).
In the following, we let X be a finite set of heterogeneous indivisible objects.
From now on, we use the term agents in lieu of firms. Agents have utility functions
over bundles of objects and transfers, u˜f : 2X ×R→ R such that for each Y ⊆ X,
u˜f (Y, ·) is continuous, strictly increasing and has full range,7 and for each t ∈ R
and Y ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ X, we have u˜f (Y, t) ≤ u˜f (Y ′, t). Each agent f is endowed with a
bundle of objects Xf ⊆ X such that Xf ∩Xf ′ = ∅ for f 6= f ′ and
⋃
f∈F Xf = X.
An exchange economy is a pair (u˜, (Xf )f∈F ) of utility functions and endowments
for each agent.
We define for each f ∈ F a demand correspondence D˜f : RX+ × 2X ⇒ 2X by
D˜f (p,Xf ) := argmaxY⊆X u˜
f (Y,
∑
x∈Xf\Y
px −
∑
x∈Y \Xf
px).
We assume that objects are gross substitutes for agents, i.e. for price vectors
p, p′ ∈ RX+ with p ≤ p′ we have that for each Y ′ ∈ D˜f (p′, Xf ), there is a Y ∈
D˜f (p,Xf ) such that {x ∈ Y : p′x = px} ⊆ Y ′. Moreover, we assume that the law
of aggregate demand holds, for price vectors p, p′ ∈ RX+ with p ≤ p′ for each
Y ′ ∈ D˜f (p′, Xf ) there exists a Y ∈ D˜f (p,Xf ) with |Y | ≥ |Y ′|.
7This assumption is only necessary for the existence result and otherwise redundant.
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Remark 6. In contrast to quasi-linear utility, the demand can differ with the en-
dowment, i.e. in general D˜f (p,Xf ) 6= D˜f (p, X˜f ) for Xf 6= X˜f .
Remark 7. Note that we assume that there is only one copy of each object. More
generally, our results would hold true, if multiple copies exist, but each agent can
supply at most one unit of each indivisible object and wants to consume at most
one unit of each indivisible object. We can deal with multi-unit supply of the same
good by a seller and multi-unit demand of the same good by a buyer in our model,
by creating identical copies of objects and price units individually. However, in
this case, we will generally have non-linear pricing. For the case of general multi-
unit demand and supply with linear pricing, we would have to modify our model
and the gross substitutability condition. For the quasi-linear case with multiple
units of the same good, see the analysis of Baldwin and Klemperer (2016) and in
particular their ordinary substitutability condition.
An allocation of objects is a partition Y = (Yf )f∈F with Yf ⊆ X and
Yf ∩ Yf ′ = ∅ for f 6= f ′. A competitive equilibrium of the exchange economy
(u˜, (Xf )f∈F ) is a pair [Y, p] where Y is an allocation of objects and p ∈ RX+ is a
price vector such that for each f ∈ F we have
Yf ∈ D˜f (p,Xf ).
For each exchange economy (u˜, (Xf )f∈F ), a corresponding trading network can
be defined as follows: The set of trades is
Ω := {(x, f 1, f 2) ∈ X × F × F : x ∈ Xf1 , f 2 6= f 1}
where for ω = (x, f1, f2) ∈ Ω we have s(ω) = f1 6= f2 = b(ω). We write x(ω) for
the object involved in trade ω and for each allocation (Ψ, p) define
Xf (Ψ) := {x(ω) : ω ∈ Ψ→f}∪Xf\{x(ω) : ω ∈ Ψf→}, pf (Ψ) :=
∑
ω∈Ψf→
pω−
∑
ω∈Ψ→f
pω.
Utility functions are induced by utility functions over bundles of objects and trans-
fers as follows:
uf (Ψ, p) =

u˜f (Xf (Ψ), pf (Ψ)), if {x(ω) : ω ∈ Ψf→} ⊆ Xf and x(ω) 6= x(ω′)
for ω, ω′ ∈ Ψ with ω 6= ω′.
−∞, else.
Remark 8. In accordance, with the previous sections each utility function uf in
the trading network induces a demand correspondence Df : RΩ ⇒ 2Ω that is also
defined for negative prices. However, by our assumption that u˜f (Y, t) ≤ u˜f (Y ′, t)
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for Y ⊆ Y ′, an agent will never sell under a negative price and always buy under
a negative price i.e.
pω < 0⇒ ω /∈ Ψ for each Ψ ∈ Ds(ω)(p) and ω ∈ Ψ for each Ψ ∈ Db(ω)(p).
Thus, negative prices for trades cannot occur in equilibrium, i.e. if p /∈ RΩ+, then
p /∈ E(u).
The gross substitutes condition for u˜f corresponds to the full substitutabil-
ity condition for uf and the law of aggregate demand for u˜f implies the laws of
aggregate demand and supply for uf .
Lemma 3. If objects are gross substitutes under u˜f , then trades are full substitutes
under uf . If the law of aggregate demand holds under u˜f , then the laws of aggregate
demand and supply hold under uf .
In general, different trades involving the same object can be priced differently.
In the following, we call p ∈ E(u) a competitive equilibrium of the trading
network with uniform pricing, if for ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, with x(ω) = x(ω′) we have
pω′ = pω. Trades in the same object are perfect substitutes to each other for the
seller of the object, and he will sell the object to a buyer who is offering the highest
price. Thus, we can allways construct an equilibrium with uniform pricing from
an equilibrium with non-uniform pricing by setting the price of the non-realized
trades to the highest price for the involved object over all trades in the trading
network. Similarly, a competitive equilibrium in the exchange economy, induces a
competitive equilibrium with uniform pricing in the trading network. The following
theorem can be interpreted as a generalization of Theorem 10 of Hatfield et al.
(2013).
Theorem 5. 1. If p ∈ RΩ+ are equilibrium prices in the trading network induced
by an exchange economy, then (maxω∈Ω,x=x(ω) pω)x∈X ∈ RX+ are equilibrium
prices in the exchange economy.
2. If p ∈ RX+ are equilibrium prices in an exchange economy, then (px(ω))ω∈Ω ∈
RΩ+ are equilibrium prices in the trading network induced by the exchange
economy.
Proof. Let [Ψ, p] be an equilibrium in the induced trading network. Let q :=
(maxω∈Ω,x=x(ω) pω)x∈X and consider the allocation [(Xf (Ψ))f∈F , q] in the exchange
economy. By construction, we have pω ≤ qx(ω) for each ω /∈ Ψ and pω = qx(ω) for
ω ∈ Ψ. Thus
Ψf ∈ Df (p)⇒ Xf (Ψ) ∈ D˜f (q,Xf )
and [(Xf (Ψ))f∈F , q] is an equilibrium of the exchange economy.
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For the second part, let [Y, p] be an equilibrium of the exchange economy.
Define q := (px(ω))ω∈Ω and consider the arrangement [Ψ, q] in the induced trading
network with
Ψ := {ω ∈ Ω : x(ω) ∈ Y b(ω) ∩Xs(ω)}.
By construction, we have
Yf ∈ D˜f (p,Xf )⇒ Ψf ∈ Df (q).
Therefore [Ψ, q] is an equilibrium of the induced trading network.
An immediate consequence is the existence of competitive equilibria if objects
are gross substitutes for agents.
Corollary 2. In each exchange economy such that objects are gross substitutes for
agents, there exists a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. By the full range assumption, there exists a K > 0 such that for each f ∈ F
and Y ⊆ X we have u˜f (Y,−K) < u˜f (Xf , 0). Thus for each allocation (Ψ, p) in the
induced trading network with uf (Ψ, p) = u˜f (Xf (Ψ), pf (Ψ)) ≥ u˜f (Xf , 0) = uf (∅)
for each f ∈ F , we have pf (Ψ) > −K for each f ∈ F . Thus, the bounded compen-
sating variation assumption of Fleiner et al. (2018) is satisfied. By Lemma 3, uf
satisfies FS for each f ∈ F . Thus, Theorem 1 of Fleiner et al. (2018), implies that
there exist an equilibrium in the induced trading network. Then the first part of
Theorem 5 implies that there exists an equilibrium in the exchange economy.
Theorem 5 and the previous results for trading networks imply the following
theorem:
Theorem 6. Let (u˜, (Xf )f∈F ) be an exchange economy such that objects are gross
substitutes for agents and the law of aggregate demand holds.
1. Lattice Theorem: Let p, p′ ∈ RX+ be competitive price vectors. Then the
price vectors p¯, p ∈ RX+ defined by
p¯x := max{px, p′x}, px := min{px, p′x},
are competitive equilibrium prices.
2. Rural Hospitals Theorem: Let p, p′ be competitive price vectors. For each
equilibrium [Y, p] there exists an assignment Y ′ such that for each f ∈ F
|Yf | = |Y ′f |, i.e. f consumes the same number of objects in Y and Y ′.
3. Existence of Extremal equilibria: There exist competitive price vectors
p¯, p ∈ RX+ , such that for each competitive price vector p ∈ RX+ and x ∈ X we
have
p
x
≤ px ≤ p¯x.
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Remark 9. Throughout this section, we have made the assumption that utility
depends on the total amount of the divisible good, but not on how transfers of
the divisible good are obtained through different trades. For the induced trading
network this means that utility satisfies the no frictions assumption. Frictions for
individual trades in the trading network can lead to non-uniform pricing. Suppose
for example that an agent is endowed with an object and faces different trans-
actions costs depending on whom he is selling the object to. In this case, he
might have an incentive to sell the object to a buyer who is offering a lower price,
because transaction costs with this buyer are lower than with other buyers who
offer a higher price. Thus Theorem 5, can fail to hold in the presence of frictions.
A slightly more general version of the theorem can be obtained, where it is as-
sumed that utility is symmetric in transfers from different trades with the same
objects, but transfers from trades with different objects can enter the utility asym-
metrically. In this case, trades in different objects can contain different frictions,
however, trades of the same objects are perfect substitutes for each other.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have established several structural results for the set of equilibria
in bilateral trading networks with transfers, making only minimal assumption on
utility functions. Quasi-linearity can be replaced by the assumption of monotonic-
ity and continuity to obtain versions of the lattice and the rural hospitals theorems.
With additional minimal assumptions, the side-optimality theorem generalizes be-
yond quasi-linear utility and a group-incentive-compatibility can be obtained. Our
results are applicable to a wide range of situations where the assumption of quasi-
linearity is unrealistic because of imperfectly transferable utility or the presence
of transaction frictions.
Our approach for proving the results can be interpreted as a tie-breaking ap-
proach, where for prices where demand is multi-valued we show that a well-behaved
selection from the demand correspondence can be made. After ties have been bro-
ken standard techniques can be applied to obtain the lattice theorem and the
rural hospitals theorem. This motivates us to pose two open questions for future
research: First, can results for the bilateral trading networks model without trans-
fers as in Fleiner et al. (2016), generalize from strict preferences to preferences
with ties?8 A recent result by Hatfield et al. (2018) is very much in this spirit.
The authors show that chain-stable and stable outcomes are equivalent for trad-
ing networks without making assumptions of monotonicity or continuity on utility
8For marriage markets, the lattice result extends to the case with ties for strongly stable
matchings (Manlove, 2002). We conjecture that for a strong notion of trail-stability similar
results can be obtained in the context of trading networks with ties.
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functions. Hence their result applies to both trading networks with and without
transfers.
Second, in the case of quasi-linear utility, corresponding results to ours can be
obtained through solving a generalized submodular flow problem (Candogan et al.,
2016). The optimal solutions to the flow problem correspond to a competitive
equilibrium outcome and its dual yields supporting prices. This generalizes the
linear programming approach from one-to-one matching markets with quasi-linear
utility (Shapley and Shubik, 1971). Recently, No¨ldeke and Samuelson (2018) have
shown that a more general non-linear duality theory can be used to obtain versions
of the results of Demange and Gale (1985) that generalize Shapley and Shubik
(1971) beyond quasi-linear utility. Thus it is a natural question, whether the
network flow approach to equilibria in trading networks generalizes beyond quasi-
linear utility to obtain similar results as in the present paper through different
techniques.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let p ∈ RΩ. Let
0 <  < min
Ψ∈Df (p),Ψ′ /∈Df (p)
uf (Ψ, p)− uf (Ψ′, p).
By continuity of uf in prices, for each Ψ,Ψ′ ⊆ Ωf the function
GΨ,Ψ′(p) := u
f (Ψ, p)− uf (Ψ′, p)
is continuous and there exists a δΨ,Ψ′ > 0 such that for p
′ ∈ RΩ with ‖p−p′‖ < δΨ,Ψ′
we have |GΨ,Ψ′(p)−GΨ,Ψ′(p′)| < . Define δ > 0 by
δ := min
Ψ∈Df (p),Ψ′ /∈Df (p)
δΨ,Ψ′ .
Let Ψ ∈ Df (p) and Ψ′ /∈ Df (p). Let p′ ∈ RΩ with ‖p − p′‖ < δ. By construc-
tion |GΨ,Ψ′(p) − GΨ,Ψ′(p′)| < , and GΨ,Ψ′(p) > . Therefore GΨ,Ψ′(p′) > 0 and
uf (Ψ, p′) > uf (Ψ′, p′). Thus, each bundle of trades that is not utility maximizing
under p is also not utility maximizing under p′. We have Df (p′) ⊆ Df (p).
We repeatedly make use of perturbation arguments, where in the case of multi-
valued demand we slightly perturb prices to obtain a price vector where the demand
is single-valued and selects from the demand at the unperturbed price vector. The
following lemma allows us to use this argument and follows from Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. Let p ∈ RΩ. For every 0 > 0 there is an  ∈ RΩ with 0 < ω < 0 for
ω ∈ Ω→f and −0 < ω < 0 for ω ∈ Ωf→ such that |Df (p+ )| = 1 and Ψ ∈ Df (p)
for the unique Ψ ∈ Df (p+ ).
Proof. Let
Φ(p) := {ω ∈ Ω : ∃Ψ ∈ Df (p) and Ψ′ ∈ Df (p) with ω ∈ Ψ, ω /∈ Ψ′}.
We prove the lemma by induction on |Φ(p)|. For each p ∈ RΩ with |Φ(p)| = 0 the
demand is single-valued and by Lemma 1 we can select a  ∈ RΩ as desired.
Now let k > 0 and suppose for each p ∈ RΩ with |Φ(p)| ≤ k there is for each
0 > 0 an  ∈ RΩ with 0 < ω < 0 for ω ∈ Ω→f and −0 < ω < 0 for ω ∈ Ωf→
such that |Df (p + )| = 1 and Ψ ∈ Df (p) for the unique Ψ ∈ Df (p + ). Now
let p′ ∈ RΩ with |Φ(p′)| = k + 1. Let ′0 > 0. Choose an arbitrary ω˜ ∈ Φ(p′). By
Lemma 1, there exists a 1 > 0 such that for q ∈ RΩ with ‖q − p‖ < 1 we have
Df (q) ⊆ Df (p). We may choose 1 < ′0/2. Let ˜ ∈ RΩ, be defined by ˜ω˜ = 1 if
ω˜ ∈ Ω→f , resp. ˜ω˜ = −1 if ω˜ ∈ Ωf→, and ˜ω = 0 for ω 6= ω˜. As uf is monotonic,
we have |Df (p′ + ˜)| ≤ k. Thus by the induction assumption with 0 = ′0/2 and
p = p′ + ˜ there is a  ∈ RΩ with 0 < ω < 0 for ω ∈ Ω→f and −0 < ω < 0 for
ω ∈ Ωf→ such that |Df (p′+ ˜+ )| = 1 and Ψ ∈ Df (p′+ ˜) ⊆ Df (p′) for the unique
Ψ ∈ Df (p′ + + ˜). Thus we can choose ′ = + ˜.
24
B Different Versions of Full Substitutability
In Appendix A of Hatfield et al. (2019), the authors introduce the contraction
and expansion version of full substitutability that differ in regard to how they
are defined at price vectors where the demand is multi-valued. Note that full
substitutability relates the demand at two price vectors p and p′. If pω ≤ p′ω for
ω ∈ Ωf→ and p′ω = pω for ω ∈ Ω→f respectively if pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and p′ω = pω
and ω ∈ Ωf→, then the choice set expands from p′ to p, and contracts from p to
p′. The contraction version of full substitutability requires that “for all Ψ ∈ Df (p)
there is a Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) such that...” whereas the expansion version inverts the
order of quantification and requires that “for all Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) there is a Ψ ∈ Df (p)
such that...” We further split full substituability into same-side substitutability
(SSS) and cross-side complementarity (CSC) and the laws of aggregate demand
and supply, all of which are implied by all versions of full substitutability in the
quasi-linear case. We use the expansion version of SSS as our main definition.
Alternatively, we can consider the contraction version.
Contraction Same-Side Substitutability: For p, p′ ∈ RΩ and each Ψ ∈ Df (p)
there exists a Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) such that if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for
ω ∈ Ω→f , then
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′→f ,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
{ω ∈ Ψf→ : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′f→.
We have previously introduced weak full substitutability that can be further de-
composed into weak SSS and weak CSC.
Weak Same-Side Substitutability: For p, p′ ∈ RΩ such that Df (p) = {Ψ} and
Df (p′) = {Ψ′} if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f , then
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′→f ,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
{ω ∈ Ψf→ : pω = p′ω} ⊆ Ψ′f→.
All three notions of SSS, the weak, the contraction version, as well as the expansion
version that we use as our main definition are equivalent under quasi-linear utility,
as shown by Hatfield et al. (2019). Fleiner et al. (2018) show that the weak and
the expansion versions are equivalent for general utility functions (they establish
an equivalence for the notions of “decreasing-price full substitutability for sales”
and “increasing-price full substitutability for purchases”, the combination of which
is equivalent to expansion SSS).
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(2, 2, 2)
{{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω1, ω2, ω3}}
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{{ω1}, {ω3}}
{{ω2}, {ω3}}
(1, 1, 2)
Figure 2: The demand in price space for p3 = 2.
Proposition 1 (Hatfield et al., 2019; Fleiner et al., 2018). Let uf be a monotonic
and continuous utility function with induced demand Df .
1. Df satisfies weak SSS if and only if it satisfies (Expansion) SSS.
2. If Df satisfies Contraction SSS then it satisfies weak SSS.
3. If uf is quasi-linear and Df satisfies weak SSS, then Df satisfies Contraction
SSS.
In general weak SSS does not imply Contraction SSS as the following example
shows. See Figure 2 for a geometric representation of the demand in the example.
Example 3. Consider three trades Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} with f = b(ω1) = b(ω2) =
b(ω3). We let u
f (∅) = 0, uf ({ωi}, pi) = 3 − pi for i = 1, 2, 3, uf ({ωi, ωj}, pi, pj) =
4− pi − pj for i 6= j and
uf ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, p) =

4− p1 − p2 − p3 if p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ 0
4− 3
√
p1+p2+p3
6
if 6 ≥ p1 + p2 + p3 > 0,
7− p1 − p2 − p3 else
Observe that
Df (2, 2, 2) = {{ω1, ω2, ω3}, {ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}},
but
Df (3, 2, 2) = {{ω2}, {ω3}}.
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As {ω1, ω2, ω3} ∈ Df (2, 2, 2), Contraction SSS would require that there is a Ψ ∈
Df (3, 2, 2) with {ω2, ω3} ⊆ Ψ. Hence Contraction SSS is not satisfied. As the
demand at (2, 2, 2) and (3, 2, 2) is multi-valued, Weak SSS does not impose any
structure here. More generally, note that if we replace uf by the quasi-linear utility
functions u˜f such that u˜f ({ω1, ω2, ω3}, p) = 4 − p1 − p2 − p3 for all p ∈ RΩ and
uf remains otherwise unchanged, only the demand at prices (2, 2, 2) changes. One
readily checks that u˜f satisfies (Weak) SSS. Hence uf satisfies Weak SSS.
Similarly as for Same-Side Substitutabilty, we can define an alternative version
of Cross-Side Complementarity.
Contraction Cross-Side Complementarity: For each Ψ ∈ Df (p) there exists
a Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) such if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f , then
Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψf→,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
Ψ′→f ⊆ Ψ→f .
As before, we also define a weak version of CSC that together with Weak SSS
defines Weak Full Substitutability.
Weak Cross-Side Complementarity: For each p, p′ ∈ RΩ with Df (p) = {Ψ}
and Df (p′) = {Ψ′} such if pω = p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f , then
Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψf→,
and if pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for ω ∈ Ωf→, then
Ψ′→f ⊆ Ψ→f .
Similarly as for SSS, the weak, the contraction version as well as the expansion
version of CSC that we use as our main definition are equivalent under quasi-linear
utility, as shown by Hatfield et al. (2019). Fleiner et al. (2018) show that the weak
and the contraction versions are equivalent for general preferences (they establish
an equivalence for the notions of “increasing-price full substitutability for sales”
and “decreasing-price full substitutability for purchases” whose combinations is
equivalent to contraction CSC).
Proposition 2 (Hatfield et al., 2019; Fleiner et al., 2018). Let uf be a monotonic
and continuous utility function with induced demand Df .
1. Df satisfies weak CSC if and only if it satisfies Contraction CSC.
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2. If Df satisfies (Expansion) CSC then it satisfies Weak CSC.
3. If uf is quasi-linear and Df satisfies Weak CSC, then Df satisfies (Expan-
sion) CSC.
In general weak CSC does not imply (expansion) CSC as our Example 1 shows.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First we show the first part of the lemma. By monotonicity of uf it suffices
to consider the case that p′ω = pω for ω ∈ Ωf \ Ψ′. Moreover, by upper hemi-
continuity of Df it suffices to consider the case that p′ω 6= pω for ω ∈ Ψ′.
Let 0 < 0 < minω∈Ψ′ |p′ω − pω|. By Lemma 4, there exists an an  ∈ RΩ with
0 < ω < 0 for ω ∈ Ω→f and −0 < ω < 0 for ω ∈ Ωf→ such that |Df (p+ )| = 1
and Ψ ∈ Df (p) for the unique Ψ ∈ Df (p+ ). Define
′ω :=
{
ω, if ω ∈ Ωf \Ψ′f ,
0, if ω ∈ Ψ′f .
Observe that by monotonicity of uf for each Ξ ⊆ Ωf we have uf (Ξ, p′ + ′) ≤
uf (Ξ, p′). Moreover, as ′ω = 0 for ω ∈ Ψ′ , we have uf (Ψ′, p′ + ′) = uf (Ψ′, p′).
Thus Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′ + ′).
Now consider the unique Ψ ∈ Df (p + ). We will show that Ψ′ = Ψ. As
Ψ ∈ Df (p) this will prove the first part of the lemma. Let p˜ ∈ RΩ be defined by
p˜ω :=
{
p′ω + 
′
ω for ω ∈ Ωf→,
pω + ω for ω ∈ Ω→f .
First we show the following:
Claim 1. There exists a Ψ˜ ∈ Df (p˜) with Ψ˜→f ⊆ Ψ′→f and Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψ˜f→.
Proof. As p˜ω = pω + ω = p
′
ω + 
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f \ Ψ′, the first part of the SSS
condition applied at prices p˜ and p′ + ′ implies that there is a Ψ¯ ∈ Df (p˜) with
Ψ¯→f ⊆ Ψ′→f .
Let ˜ ∈ RΩ with ˜ω > 0 for ω ∈ Ω→f \ Ψ′→f and ˜ω = 0 otherwise. By
monotonicity of uf , for each Ψ˜ ⊆ Ωf with Ψ˜→f 6⊆ Ψ′→f we have uf (Ψ˜, p˜ + ˜) <
uf (Ψ˜, p˜) and for each Ψ˜ ⊆ Ωf with Ψ˜→f ⊆ Ψ′→f we have uf (Ψ˜, p˜ + ˜) = uf (Ψ˜, p˜).
Thus, as Ψ¯ ∈ Df (p˜) and Ψ¯→f ⊆ Ψ′→f , for each Ψ˜ ∈ Df (p˜+ ˜) we have Ψ˜→f ⊆ Ψ′→f
and Ψ˜ ∈ Df (p˜).
By monotonicity of uf , for each Ψ˜ ⊆ Ωf , we have uf (Ψ˜, p′+′+˜) ≤ uf (Ψ˜, p′+′)
and we have uf (Ψ′, p′ + ′ + ˜) = uf (Ψ′, p′ + ′). Thus Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′ + ′ + ˜). As
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Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′ + ′ + ˜), the first part of CSC condition applied to prices p˜ + ˜ and
p′ + ′ + ˜ implies that there is a Ψ˜ ∈ Df (p˜ + ˜) with Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψ˜f→. As previously
observed, we have Ψ˜→f ⊆ Ψ′→f and Ψ˜ ∈ Df (p˜).
With the claim we can prove the first part of the lemma. Let Ψ˜ ∈ Df (p˜) as
in the claim. As Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψ˜f→ and p˜ω = p′ω + ′ω = pω + ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ \ Ψ′,
the second part of the SSS condition applied to prices p +  and p˜ (recall that
Df (p+ ) = {Ψ}) implies Ψf→ ⊆ Ψ˜f→. By the second part of the CSC condition
applied to prices p+  and p˜ (recall that Df (p+ ) = {Ψ}), we have Ψ˜→f ⊆ Ψ→f .
By LAS applied to prices p+  and p˜ we have
|Ψf→| − |Ψ→f | ≥ |Ψ˜f→| − |Ψ˜→f |.
Thus Ψ˜ = Ψ. By LAD applied to prices p˜ and p′ + ′ there exists a Ψˆ ∈ Df (p˜)
(possibly Ψˆ 6= Ψ˜ = Ψ) such that
|Ψˆ→f | − |Ψˆf→| ≥ |Ψ′→f | − |Ψ′f→|.
By LAS applied to prices p+  and p˜ (recall that Df (p+ ) = {Ψ}), we have
|Ψˆf→| − |Ψˆ→f | ≥ |Ψf→| − |Ψ→f |.
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ψ′→f | − |Ψ′f→|.
Combining this with the observation that Ψ→f = Ψ˜→f ⊆ Ψ′→f and Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψ˜f→ =
Ψf→, we have Ψ′ = Ψ.
Now we show the second part of the lemma. Suppose all of the inequalities are
strict but there is a Ξ 6= Ψ′ with Ξ ∈ Df (p). Then there is a ω˜ ∈ Ωf with ω˜ ∈ Ξ\Ψ′
or ω˜ ∈ Ψ\Ξ. In the first case, let p˜ ∈ RΩ with p˜ω˜ = p′ω˜ and p˜ω = pω for ω 6= ω˜. Note
that by the first part of the lemma we have Ψ′ ∈ Df (p˜). Thus, by monotonicity,
we have uf (Ξ, p) < uf (Ξ, p˜) ≤ uf (Ψ′, p˜) = uf (Ψ′, p) contradicting the assumption
that Ξ ∈ Df (p). In the second case, let p˜ ∈ RΩ with p˜ω˜ = p′ω˜ and p˜ω = pω for
ω 6= ω˜. Note that by the first part of the lemma we have Ψ′ ∈ Df (p˜). Thus, by
monotonicity, we have uf (Ξ, p) = uf (Ξ, p˜) ≤ uf (Ψ′, p˜) < uf (Ψ′, p) contradicting
the assumption that Ξ ∈ Df (p).
D Proof of Theorems 1
The proof relies on the following two lemmata.
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Lemma 5. Let uf be a utility function inducing a demand correspondence Df
satisfying FS, LAD and LAS. Let P ⊆ RΩ be finite. Then there is a (single-
valued) demand function D˜f : P → 2Ωf that selects from Df , i.e. D˜f (p) ∈ Df (p)
for p ∈ P and satisfies FS, LAD and LAS.
Proof. By Lemma 1, there exists an 0 > 0 such that for each p ∈ P and every q
with ‖q − p‖ < 0 we have Df (q) ⊆ Df (p). Let P = {p1, . . . , pn}. By Lemma 4,
there is a 1 ∈ RΩ with ‖1‖ < 0 such that |Df (p1 + 1)| = 1 and Ψ ∈ Df (p1)
for the unique Ψ ∈ Df (p1 + 1). Consider P 1 := {p1 + 1, . . . , pn + 1}. For
each i = 1, . . . , n we have Df (pi + 1) ⊆ Df (pi). By Lemma 1, there exists
an 1 > 0 such that for each p ∈ P 1 and every q with ‖q − p‖ < 1 we have
Df (q) ⊆ Df (p). By Lemma 4, there is a 2 ∈ RΩ with ‖2‖ < 1 such that
|Df (p2 + 1 + 2)| = 1 and Ψ ∈ Df (p2 + 2) for the unique Ψ ∈ Df (p2 + 1). Next
consider P 2 := {p1 + 1 + 2, . . . , pn + 1 + 2}. For each i = 1, . . . , n we have
Df (pi + 1 + 2) ⊆ Df (pi + 1) ⊆ Df (pi) and so on. Iterating in this way, we
obtain 1, . . . , n such that for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have |Df (pi +∑nj=1 j)| = 1
and Ψi ∈ Df (pi) for the unique Ψi ∈ Df (pi + ∑nj=1 j) ⊆ Df (pi). We define
D˜f (pi) = Ψi. By construction D˜f (pi) ∈ Df (pi). Moreover, as all price vectors
are translated by the same vector
∑n
j=1 
j, FS, LAD and LAS are inherited from
Df .
Lemma 6. Let p, p′ ∈ RΩ and define p¯, p ∈ RΩ by
pω := max{pω, p′ω}, pω := min{pω, p′ω}.
Let Ψ ∈ Df (p) and Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′).
1. There is a Ψ¯ ∈ Df (p¯) with
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω ≥ p′ω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′→f : p′ω > pω} ⊆ Ψ¯→f ,
Ψ¯f→ ⊆ {ω ∈ Ψf→ : pω ≥ p′ω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′f→ : p′ω > pω}.
2. There is a Ψ ∈ Df (p) with
Ψ→f ⊆ {ω ∈ Ψ→f : p′ω ≥ pω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′→f : pω > p′ω},
{ω ∈ Ψf→ : p′ω ≥ pω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′f→ : pω > p′ω} ⊆ Ψf→.
3. Ψ¯ and Ψ can be chosen such that
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ψ¯→f | − |Ψ¯f→|.
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Proof. By Lemma 1, there exists an 0 > 0 such that for each q ∈ {p, p′, p¯, p}
and every q˜ with ‖q˜ − q‖ < √|Ωf | · 0 we have Df (q˜) ⊆ Df (q). We may choose
0 < minω∈Ω:p′ω 6=pω |p′ω − pω|.
Define ′ ∈ RΩf by
′ω =

0, if ω ∈ Ψ′f→ and p′ω 6= pω,
−0, if ω ∈ Ωf→ \Ψ′ and p′ω 6= pω,
−0, if ω ∈ Ψ′→f and p′ω 6= pω,
0, if ω ∈ Ω→f \Ψ′ and p′ω 6= pω,
0, if p′ω = pω.
First we prove the following claim.
Claim 2. For each Ξ ∈ Df (p′ + ′) we have {ω ∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ⊆ Ξ and
{ω /∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ∩ Ξ = ∅.
Proof. First we show that for each Ξ ∈ Df (p′+′) we have {ω ∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ⊆ Ξ.
Suppose not, and there is a Ξ ∈ Df (p′ + ′) and a ω˜ ∈ {ω ∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} \ Ξ.
Let p˜ ∈ RΩf with p˜ω˜ = p′ω˜ and p˜ω = p′ω + ′ω for ω 6= ω˜. Note that by Lemma 2,
we have Ψ′ ∈ Df (p˜). Thus, by monotonicity, we have uf (Ξ, p′ + ′) = uf (Ξ, p˜) ≤
uf (Ψ′, p˜) < uf (Ψ′, p′ + ′) contradicting the assumption that Ξ ∈ Df (p′ + ′).
Next we show that for each Ξ ∈ Df (p′+′) we have {ω /∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω}∩Ξ = ∅.
Suppose not, and there is a Ξ ∈ Df (p′ + ′) and a ω˜ ∈ {ω /∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ∩ Ξ.
Let p˜ ∈ RΩf with p˜ω˜ = p′ω˜ and p˜ω = p′ω + ′ω for ω 6= ω˜. Note that by Lemma 2,
we have Ψ′ ∈ Df (p˜). Thus, by monotonicity, we have uf (Ξ, p′ + ′) < uf (Ξ, p˜) ≤
uf (Ψ′, p˜) = uf (Ψ′, p′ + ′) contradicting the assumption that Ξ ∈ Df (p′ + ′).
By Lemma 1, there exists another 1 > 0 such that for every q with ‖q − (p′ +
′)‖ < 1 we have Df (q) ⊆ Df (p′ + ′). We may choose 1 such that 1 < 0.
Define prices p(), p′(), p¯(), p() ∈ RΩf as follows:
p()ω :=

pω + 1, if ω ∈ Ψf→,
pω − 1, if ω ∈ Ωf→ \Ψ,
pω − 1, if ω ∈ Ψ→f ,
pω + 1, if ω ∈ Ω→f \Ψ.
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p′()ω :=

p′ω + 0, if ω ∈ Ψ′f→ and p′ω 6= pω,
p′ω − 0, if ω ∈ Ωf→ \Ψ′ and p′ω 6= pω,
p′ω − 0, if ω ∈ Ψ′→f and p′ω 6= pω,
p′ω + 0, if ω ∈ Ω→f \Ψ′ and p′ω 6= pω,
pω + 1, if ω ∈ Ψf→ and p′ω = pω,
pω − 1, if ω ∈ Ωf→ \Ψ and p′ω = pω,
pω − 1, if ω ∈ Ψ→f and p′ω = pω,
pω + 1, if ω ∈ Ω→f \Ψ and p′ω = pω.
p¯()ω := max{p()ω, p′()ω}
p()ω := min{p()ω, p′()ω}.
By Lemma 2, we have Df (p()) = {Ψ}. Moreover, we have Df (p′()) ⊆ Df (p′+
′) ⊆ Df (p′), Df (p¯()) ⊆ Df (p¯) and Df (p()) ⊆ Df (p).
Let P := {p˜ ∈ RΩf : p˜ω ∈ {p()ω, p′()ω} for all ω ∈ Ωf}. By Lemma 5,
there is a single-valued selection D˜f : P → 2Ωf from Df satisfying FS, LAD
and LAS. Let Ψ¯ := D˜f (p¯()) and Ψ := D˜f (p()). As Df (p()) = {Ψ}, we have
D˜f (p()) = Ψ. Moreover, by Claim 2 and as Ψ′′ := D˜f (p′()) ∈ Df (p′ + ′), we
have {ω ∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ⊆ Ψ′′ and {ω /∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ∩Ψ′′ = ∅.
By FS of D˜f and since {ω ∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω} ⊆ Ψ′′, we have
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω ≥ p′ω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′→f : p′ω > pω}
⊆{ω ∈ Ψ→f : pω() ≥ p′ω()} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′′→f : p′ω() > pω()} ⊆ Ψ¯→f .
Next we show that
Ψ¯f→ ⊆ {ω ∈ Ψf→ : p′ω ≥ pω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ψ′f→ : p′ω > pω}.
Let ω¯ ∈ Ψ¯f→. We consider two cases. Either p¯ω¯ = pω¯ or p¯ω¯ = p′ω¯ > pω¯. In the first
case, consider p˜ ∈ RΩf with p˜ω = p¯()ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and p˜ω = p()ω for ω ∈ Ωf→.
Let Ψ˜ := D˜f (p˜). By SSS of D˜f , we have ω¯ ∈ Ψ˜f→. By CSC, we have Ψ˜f→ ⊆ Ψf→
and hence ω¯ ∈ Ψf→.
Similarly, if p¯ω¯ = p
′
ω¯ > pω¯, consider p˜ ∈ RΩf with p˜ω = p¯()ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and
p˜ω = p
′()ω for ω ∈ Ωf→. Let Ψ˜ := D˜f (p˜). By SSS of D˜f we have ω¯ ∈ Ψ˜f→. By
CSC, we have Ψ˜f→ ⊆ Ψ′′f→ and hence ω¯ ∈ Ψ′′f→. Since {ω /∈ Ψ′ : p′ω 6= pω}∩Ψ′′ = ∅
and p′ω¯ 6= pω¯ this implies ω¯ ∈ Ψ′f→. A completely analogous proof shows that Ψ
has the desired properties. Finally, by LAD and LAS for D˜f , we have
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ψ¯→f | − |Ψ¯f→|.
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With this lemma we can prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let Ξ ∈ E(u, p) and Ξ′ ∈ E(u, p′). Define
Ξ := {ω ∈ Ξ : pω ≥ p′ω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ξ′ : p′ω > pω},
Ξ := {ω ∈ Ξ : p′ω ≥ pω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ξ′ : pω > p′ω}.
We show that Ξ ∈ E(u, p¯) and Ξ ∈ E(u, p). Let f ∈ F . By Lemma 6, with Ψ = Ξf
and Ψ′ = Ξ′f there is a Ψf ∈ Df (p¯) and a Ψf ∈ Df (p) such that Ξ→f ⊆ Ψ→f ,
Ψf→ ⊆ Ξf→, Ψ→f ⊆ Ξ→f and Ξf→ ⊆ Ψf→ and
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| ≥ |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→| ≥ |Ψ→f | − |Ψf→|.
Note that this implies
|Ξ→f |− |Ξf→| ≥ |Ψ→f |− |Ψf→| ≥ |Ξ→f |− |Ξf→| ≥ |Ψ→f |− |Ψf→| ≥ |Ξ→f |− |Ξf→|.
Summing the inequalities over all firms, we obtain
0 ≥
∑
f∈F
(|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→|) ≥ 0 ≥
∑
f∈F
(|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→|) ≥ 0.
Thus
|Ξ| =
∑
f∈F
|Ξf→| ≤
∑
f∈F
|Ψf→| =
∑
f∈F
|Ψ→f | ≤
∑
f∈F
|Ξ→f | = |Ξ|.
Therefore Ξf = Ψf for each f ∈ F . Moreover,
|Ξ| =
∑
f∈F
|Ξ→f | ≤
∑
f∈F
|Ψ→f | =
∑
f∈F
|Ψf→| ≤
∑
f∈F
|Ξ→f | = |Ξ|.
Therefore Ξf = Ψf for each f ∈ F .
Next we show that the above construction implies the rural hospital theorem:
AS Ψ = Ξ and Ψ = Ξ, for each f ∈ F we have
|Ξ→f | − |Ξf→| ≥ |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→| ≥ |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→|.
Summing the inequalities over all f , we obtain
0 =
∑
f∈F
|Ξ→f | −
∑
f∈F
|Ξf→| ≥
∑
f∈F
|Ξ→f | −
∑
f∈F
|Ξf→| ≥
∑
f∈F
|Ξ→f | −
∑
f∈F
|Ξf→| = 0.
Thus, for each f ∈ F we have
|Ξ→f | − |Ξf→| = |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→| = |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→|.
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Now observe that by the above reasoning (with [Ξ, p¯] in the role of [Ξ, p]) for the
set of trades
Ξ′′ := {ω ∈ Ξ : p¯ω = pω} ∪ {ω ∈ Ξ′ : p¯ω > p′ω},
arrangement [Ξ′′, p′] is an equilibrium and for each f ∈ F we have
|Ξ′′→f | − |Ξ′′f→| = |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→|.
Since
|Ξ→f | − |Ξf→| = |Ξ→f | − |Ξf→|,
this concludes the proof.
E Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let F ′ ⊆ F be the set of terminal buyers. Let U =×f∈F Uf where for
f ∈ F ′ the set Uf is the set of unit demand and BWP utility functions and for
each f ∈ F \F ′ the set Uf is the set of BWP, FS, LAD and LAD utility functions.
Let M : U → A be a buyer-optimal mechanism. First we establish that M is
immune to truncation strategies.
Claim 3. Let f ∈ F ′. Let u, u˜ ∈ U with u˜−f = u−f and let [Ψ, p] be a buyer-
optimal equilibrium under u. If Ψf 6= ∅, u˜f (ω, ·) = uf (ω, ·) for each ω ∈ Ω→f and
u˜f (∅) > u˜f (Ψ, p), then for each equilibrium [Ψ˜, p˜] under u˜, we have Ψ˜f = ∅.
Proof. Suppose not. Then Ψ˜f 6= ∅. Let Ψ˜f = {ω˜}. Note that also {ω˜} ∈ Df (p˜).
Thus [Ψ˜, p˜] is an equilibrium under u. But since
uf (ω˜, p˜ω˜) = u˜
f (ω˜, p˜ω˜) ≥ u˜f (∅) > u˜f (Ψ, p) = uf (Ψ, p)
this contradicts the buyer optimality of [Ψ, p].
Second we establish that M is immune to certain strategies where a single
terminal buyer changes the utility function for one trade.
Claim 4. Let f ∈ F ′. Let u, uˆ ∈ U with uˆ−f = u−f such that there is a ωˆ ∈ Ω→f
with uˆf (ω, ·) = uf (ω, ·) for ω 6= ωˆ and uˆf (∅) = uf (∅). Let [Ψ¯, p¯] be a buyer-optimal
equilibrium under u. If for all pωˆ ∈ R, we have
uf (ωˆ, pωˆ) ≤ uf (Ψ¯, p¯)⇒ uˆf (ωˆ, pωˆ) = uf (ωˆ, pωˆ),
uf (ωˆ, pωˆ) ≥ uf (Ψ¯, p¯)⇒ uˆf (ωˆ, pωˆ) ≥ uf (ωˆ, pωˆ),
then [Ψ¯, p¯] is a buyer-optimal equilibrium under uˆ.
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Proof. Let [Ψˆ, pˆ] be a buyer optimal equilibrium under uˆ. If uf (ωˆ, pˆωˆ) ≤ uf (Ψ¯, p¯),
then we have Df (pˆ) = Dˆf (pˆ) and [Ψˆ, pˆ] is an equilibrium under u. In this case,
by buyer-optimality of [Ψ¯, p¯] under u, we have uˆf
′
(Ψˆ, pˆ) = uf
′
(Ψˆ, pˆ) ≤ uf ′(Ψ¯, p¯) =
uf
′
(Ψ¯, p¯) for each f ′ ∈ F ′. Now note that uˆf (ωˆ, p¯ωˆ) = uˆf (ωˆ, p¯ωˆ), and therefore
[Ψ¯, p¯] is an equilibrium under uˆ. Thus, in this case [Ψ¯, p¯] is a buyer-optimal
equilibrium under uˆ. It remains to consider the case that uf (ωˆ, pˆωˆ) > u
f (Ψ¯, p¯). In
this case, consider the two sub-cases that Ψˆf = {ωˆ} or Ψˆf 6= {ωˆ}.
If Ψˆf 6= {ωˆ}, we can show that [Ψˆ, pˆ] is an equilibrium under u. Suppose not.
Then, as Ψˆf /∈ Df (pˆ) and uf (ω, pˆω) = uˆf (ω, pˆω) for ω 6= ωˆ, we have uf (ωˆ, pˆωˆ) >
uf (Ψˆ, pˆ). Thus uˆf (ωˆ, pˆωˆ) ≥ uf (ωˆ, pˆωˆ) > uf (Ψˆ, pˆ) = uˆf (Ψˆ, pˆ) and therefore Ψˆf /∈
Dˆf (pˆ). This contradicts the assumption that [Ψˆ, pˆ] is an equilibrium under uˆ.
Thus, [Ψˆ, pˆ] is an equilibrium under u and by the same reasoning as above, [Ψ¯, p¯]
is a buyer-optimal equilibrium under uˆ.
If Ψˆf = {ωˆ}, consider the utility function u˜f obtained from uf by truncating
as follows: u˜f (ω, ·) = uf (ω, ·) for all ω ∈ Ω→f and uf (Ψ¯, p¯) < u˜f (∅) < uf (ωˆ, pˆωˆ).
By Claim 3, for each equilibrium [Ψ, p] under u˜ we have Ψf = ∅. Define the utility
function u˜f∗ by u˜
f
∗(ωˆ, ·) = u˜f (ωˆ, ·) = uf (ωˆ, ·), by u˜f∗(ω, ·) = −∞ for each ω 6= ωˆ,
and u˜f∗(∅) = u˜f (∅). As for each equilibrium [Ψ, p] under u˜ we have Ψf = ∅, we
have E(u˜) ⊆ E(u˜∗), and in particular, there is an equilibrium [Ψ˜, p˜] under u˜∗ with
Ψ˜f = ∅. Observe however that u˜f∗(ωˆ, pˆωˆ) = u˜f (ωˆ, pˆωˆ) = u(ωˆ, pˆωˆ) > u˜f∗(∅). Thus
D˜f∗ (pˆ) = {{ωˆ}} and [Ψˆ, pˆ] is an equilibrium under u˜∗ with u˜f∗(Ψˆ, pˆ) > u˜f∗(∅). This
contradicts the rural hospitals theorem (the second part of Theorem 1).
With the claim, we can prove the result. Suppose there are profiles u, u˜ ∈ U
such that u˜−F
′
= u−F
′
and for each f ∈ F ′, we have
uf (M(u˜)) > uf (M(u)),
Let M(u) = (Ψ¯, p¯) and M(u˜) = (Ψ˜, p˜). By BWP for u and for u˜, there exists a
K > 0 such that for all p ∈ RΩ and all ω ∈ Ω, if ω ∈ Ψ ∈ Db(ω)(p) then pω < K,
if ω ∈ Ψ ∈ Ds(ω)(p) then pω > −K, if ω ∈ Ψ ∈ D˜b(ω)(p) then pω < K, and if
ω ∈ Ψ ∈ D˜s(ω)(p), then pω > −K. Thus we can specify prices for non realized
trades at (Ψ, p) to obtain p ∈ E(u) with p ∈ [−K,K]Ω and similarly we can specify
prices for non realized trades at (Ψ˜, p˜) to obtain p˜ ∈ E(u˜) with p˜ ∈ [−K,K]Ω.
Now we define for each f ∈ F ′, a uˆf ∈ Uf as follows: Note that Ψ˜f 6= ∅ as
uf (Ψ˜, p˜) > uf (Ψ¯, p¯) ≥ uf (∅). Let ω˜ ∈ Ψ˜ be the unique trade in Ψ˜ such that
b(ω˜) = f . We let uˆf (ω, ·) = uf (ω, ·) for ω 6= ω˜ and we let uˆf (∅) = uf (∅). To
construct uˆf (ω˜, ·) we proceed as follows: Define uˆf (ω˜, pω˜) := uf (ω˜, pω˜) for each
pω˜ ∈ R with uf (ω˜, pω˜) ≤ uf (Ψ¯, p¯). Define u¯ := maxω∈Ω→f uf (ω,−K) and
uˆf (ω˜, p˜ω˜) := max{u¯, u˜f (ω˜, p˜ω˜)}.
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Note that
uˆf (ω˜, p˜ω˜) ≥ u¯ ≥ uf (ω˜,−K) > uf (ω˜, p˜ω˜) > uf (Ψ¯, p¯),
where the penultimate inequality follows by monotonicity, as ω˜ ∈ Ψ˜s(ω) ∈ Ds(ω)(p˜)
and therefore −K < p˜ω˜. For prices pω˜ 6= p˜ω˜ with uf (ω˜, pω˜) ≥ uf (Ψ¯, p¯), we can
choose any continuous and monotonic extension such that uˆf (ω˜, pω˜) ≥ uf (ω˜, pω˜).
By Claim 4, [Ψ¯, p¯] is a buyer-optimal equilibrium for (uˆf , u−f ). Iterating for all
f ∈ F ′, [Ψ¯, p¯] is a buyer-optimal equilibrium under uˆ := (uˆF ′ , u−F ). Note however
that by construction, for each f ∈ F ′ we have Dˆf (p˜) = {Ψˆf}. Thus [Ψˆ, pˆ] is an
equilibrium under uˆ with uˆf (Ψˆ, pˆ) > uˆf (Ψ¯, p¯) for each f ∈ F ′. This contradicts
the buyer-optimality of [Ψ¯, p¯] under (uˆF
′
, u−F ).
F Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let p, p′ ∈ RΩ+ Define q ∈ RX+ by
qx :=
{
minω∈Ω→f :x(ω)=x pω, for x /∈ Xf ,
maxω∈Ωf→:x(ω)=x pω, for x ∈ Xf ,
q′x :=
{
minω∈Ω→f :x(ω)=x p
′
ω, for x /∈ Xf ,
maxω∈Ωf→:x(ω)=x p
′
ω, for x ∈ Xf .
By construction we have
Df (p) = {Ψ ⊆ Ω : Xf (Ψ) ∈ D˜f (q), pω = qx(ω) for ω ∈ Ψ},
Df (p′) = {Ψ′ ⊆ Ω : Xf (Ψ′) ∈ D˜f (q′), p′ω = q′x(ω) for ω ∈ Ψ′}.
If pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ωf→ and pω ≤ p′ω for ω ∈ Ω→f , then for Ψ′ ∈ Df (p′) there is,
by gross substitutability a Y ∈ D˜f (q) with
{x ∈ Y : q′x = qx} ⊆ Xf (Ψ′).
Thus, if x ∈ Y \Xf and q′x = qx, then x ∈ Xf (Ψ′), and if x ∈ Xf \Xf (Ψ′), then
x ∈ Xf \ Y . Therefore there is a Ψ ∈ Df (p) with
{ω ∈ Ψ→f : p′ω = q′x(ω) = qx(ω) = pω} ⊆ Ψ′→f , Ψ′f→ ⊆ Ψf→.
Similarly, by the law of aggregate demand, there is a Y ∈ D˜f (q) such that
|Y | ≥ |Xf (Ψ)|.
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There is a Ψ ∈ Df (p) with Y = Xf (Ψ). But then
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| = |Y \Xf | − |Xf \ Y | = |Y | − |Xf |
≥|Xf (Ψ′)| − |Xf | = |Xf (Ψ′) \Xf | − |Xf \Xf (Ψ′)| = |Ψ′→f | − |Ψf→|.
An analogous argument shows that for pω = p
′
ω for ω ∈ Ω→f and pω ≥ p′ω for
ω ∈ Ωf→, we have
{ω ∈ Ψf→ : p′ω = q′x(ω) = qx(ω) = pω} ⊆ Ψ′f→, Ψ′→f ⊆ Ψ→f ,
and
|Ψf→| − |Ψ→f | ≥ |Ψ′f→| − |Ψ′→f |.
G Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. For the first part, consider price vectors in the induces trading network
q, q′ ∈ RΩ defined by qω := px(ω) and q′ω := qx(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. By Theorem 5,
q and q′ are equilibrium prices in the induced trading network. By Lemma 3,
utility functions in the induced trading network satisfy FS, LAD and LAS. Thus,
by Theorem 1, price vectors q¯, q ∈ RΩ+ with
q¯ω = max{qω, q′ω}, qω = min{qω, q′ω},
are equilibrium price vectors in the trading network. By construction of q and q′,
for each ω, ω′ ∈ Ω with x(ω) = x(ω′) we have qω = px(ω) = qω′ and q′ω = p′x(ω) = q′ω.
Therefore,
p¯x = max
ω∈Ω,x=x(ω)
q¯ω and px = maxω∈Ω,x=x(ω)
q
ω
,
and Theorem 5 implies that p¯ and p are equilibrium price vectors.
For the second part, define
Ψ := {ω ∈ Ω : x(ω) ∈ Y b(ω) ∩Xs(ω)}.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 5, [Ψ, q] is an equilibrium of the trading network.
By the second part of Theorem 1, there is a Ψ′ ⊆ Ω such that [Ψ′, q′] is an
equilibrium of the trading network with
|Ψ→f | − |Ψf→| = |Ψ′→f | − |Ψ′f→|.
Let Y ′ = (Y ′f )f∈F with Y
′
f := Xf (Ψ
′). As shown in the proof of Theorem 5,
[Y ′, p′] is an equilibrium of the exchange economy. Moreover,
|Yf | = |Yf \Xf | − |Xf \ Yf |+ |Xf | = |Ψ→f | − |Ψf→|+ |Xf |
= |Ψ′→f | − |Ψ′f→|+ |Xf | = |Y ′f \Xf | − |Xf \ Y ′f |+ |Xf | = |Y ′f |.
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For the third part, we first show that the set of equilibrium price vectors in
the induced trading network, E(u) is compact. (We have to modify the proof of
Theorem 2, as now we do not assume BWP and NUT, but instead make a full
range assumption). The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2 establishes
that E(u) is closed. To show that E(u) is bounded, note that by the full range
assumption there exists a K > 0 such that for each f ∈ F and Y ⊆ X we have
u˜f (Y,−K) < u˜f (Xf , 0). Thus, for each equilibrium [Ψ, p] in the trading network
and each f ∈ F , we have
uf (Ψ, p) = u˜f (Xf (Ψ), pf (Ψ)) ≥ u˜f (Xf , 0) = uf (∅),
and therefore by monotonicity of utility in transfers pf (Ψ) > −K. Moreover,∑
f∈F pf (Ψ) = 0. Thus, pf (Ψ) < |F | · K for each f ∈ F . By the full range
assumption, there is a K˜ > 0 such that for each f ∈ F, Y ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Xf
we have u˜f (Y ′, K˜) > u˜f (Y, |F | · K). Note that for each equilibrium [Ψ, p] of the
trading network, each f ∈ F and each Ψ′ ⊆ Ωf→ with Xf (Ψ′) = ∅, we have
u˜f (∅,
∑
ω∈Ψ′
pω) ≤ uf (Ψ, p) = u˜f (Xf (Ψ), pf (Ψ)) < u˜f (Xf (Ψ), |F | ·K) < u˜f (∅, K˜).
Thus
∑
ω∈Ψ′ pω < K˜. As pω ≥ 0 for each ω ∈ Ωf→, this implies that pω < K˜ for
each ω ∈ Ω. Thus E(u) is compact and by Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 non-empty.
Since uf satisfies FS and LAD/LAS for each f ∈ F , there exists p¯, p ∈ E(u) such
that for each p ∈ E(u) we have p
ω
≤ pω ≤ p¯ω for each ω ∈ Ω. By the first part of
Theorem 5, the vectors q, q¯ ∈ RX+ defined by
q
x
:= max
ω∈Ω,x=x(ω)
p
ω
, q¯x := max
ω∈Ω,x=x(ω)
p¯ω
are equilibrium price vectors in the exchange economy. Now let q ∈ RX+ be an
equilibrium price vector. By the second part of Theorem 5, the price vector p ∈ RΩ
defined by pω := px(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, is in E(u). Let x ∈ X. Let ω ∈ Ω with
x = x(ω) and q
x
= p
ω
. Then q
x
= p
ω
≤ pω = qx. Similarly, let ω ∈ Ω with
x = x(ω) and q¯x = p¯ω. Then q¯x = p¯ω ≥ pω = px. Thus q¯, q are the desired price
vectors.
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H Results for Trading Networks with General Preferences
Table 1: Sufficient conditions for results for trading networks with general prefer-
ences.
Result (Theorem*) Source C&M FS LADS BCV BWP NUT NF
Existence of Equil. (1) Fleiner et al. (2018) x x x
1st Welfare Theorem (2) Fleiner et al. (2018) x x
Rural Hospitals (3) Theorem 1, part 1 x x x
Lattice (4) Theorem 1, part 2 x x x
Side Optimality (4) Theorem 3 x x x x
Equil.⇒ Stable (5) Fleiner et al. (2018) x x
Stable ⇒ Equil. (6) Fleiner et al. (2018) x x x
Stable ⇔ Group-Stable (8 & 9) Fleiner et al. (2018) x x x x
Trail-Stable ⇔ Equil. Fleiner et al. (2018) x x x
Chain-Stable ⇔ Stable Hatfield et al. (2018) x x
Group-Strategy-Proofness Theorem 4 x x x x
Compactness Theorem 2 x x x
Notation:
Theorem* Corresponding theorem in Hatfield et al. (2013)
C&M stands for Continuity and Monotonicity,
FS stands for Full Substitutability,
LADS stands for the Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply,
BCV stands for Bounded Compensating Variations,
BWP stands for Bounded Willingness to Pay,
NUT stands for No Undesired Trades, and
NF stands for No Frictions.
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